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Punishment as Contract
Claire Finkelstein
This paper provides a sketch of a contractarian approach to
punishment, according to a version of contractarianism one might call
“rational contractarianism,” by contrast with the normative
contractarianism of John Rawls. Rational contractarianism suggests a
model according to which rational agents, with maximal, rather than
minimal, knowledge of their life circumstances, would agree to the
outlines of a particular social institution or set of social institutions
because they view themselves as faring best in such a society governed
by such institutions, as compared with a society governed by different
institutional schemes available for adoption. Applied to the institution of
punishment, a rational contractarian approach maintains that members
of society would reach broad agreement with one another concerning the
outlines of a system of punishment, based on the fact that they would
regard themselves as benefitting from the deterrent effect of such a
system. But they would balance the deterrence benefits of such a system
with the incursions any scheme of punishment makes into personal
liberty. Rational agents would adopt that scheme of punishment that
maximizes marginal deterrent benefit without unduly burdening
individual liberty.
The paper also suggests that a rational contractarian approach is
able to capture the best insights of the two leading alternative theories of
punishment: deterrence theory and retributivism. On the one hand,
rational contractarianism shares the deterrence view that the guiding
aim of any punishment scheme must be the deterrence of crime, where a
crime is an action that violates the background social contract. On the
other hand, rational contractarianism solves the central problem
associated with pure deterrence theories—the problem that punishment on
this view involves “using” individuals for the sake of achieving the general
social goal of deterrence. It does so by maintaining that the way in which
the aim of deterrence is incorporated into punishment theory is not
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premised on total, or even average, social utility, but on the assent of
each individual to the scheme by which such deterrent ends are pursued.
The criteria for the rationality of assent for each contractor is that the
individual regards himself as benefitting on balance from the punishment
scheme. A rational contractarian scheme of punishment thus renders the
actual punishment of offenders under the rules of the system voluntary, in
that each rational member of society has given his own prior agreement
to be governed by the punishment institution in the event that he ends up
committing a crime. A voluntary punishment scheme avoids the problem
of “using” individuals for the sake of deterring other agents, because it
represents instead the decision of each rational contractor to allow others
to hold him to a set of agreed upon consequences for violations of the
social contract. The aim of deterrence, therefore, does not cause the
theory to “travel across persons” in the way that deterrence theories do.
I. INTRODUCTION
In Crito, Socrates discourses with a former student in his prison cell, where he
awaits his execution.1 Crito has come to implore Socrates to submit to a plan to
secure his escape from prison.2 Socrates, who had been tried and convicted of the
charge of ―corrupting the minds of the young‖ of Athens,3 steadfastly resisted the
option of banishment during his trial, as he believed himself innocent of the
charges against him. He now sees himself as bound to submit to his sentence,
despite his equally firm conviction that it represents a miscarriage of justice. He
rejects all arguments to the effect that such miscarriage entitles him to evade the
State’s verdict and violate its laws, even under threat of death.4
Socrates’s argument to Crito is worth attending to, for it is not commonly
heard in contemporary discussions of punishment.5 In brief, it is that he, Socrates,
1
PLATO, Crito, in THE COLLECTED DIALOGUES OF PLATO 27 (Edith Hamilton & Huntington
Cairns eds., Hugh Tredennick trans., 1961).
2
Id. at 29.
3
PLATO, Socrates’ Defense (Apology), in THE COLLECTED DIALOGUES OF PLATO 3, 10 (Edith
Hamilton & Huntington Cairns eds., Hugh Tredennick trans., 1961).
4
PLATO, supra note 1, at 31–39.
5
Two other recent philosophical articles about punishment draw on Crito as a source of
inspiration for contemporary punishment theory. Those articles, however, make use of the dialogue
to underscore the existence of a right of resistance, in opposition to Socrates’s stance in Crito. Larry
May uses the dialogue to suggest the parameters of legitimate disobedience to legal orders. He
writes: ―[U]nless Socrates’s act of disobedience was intended to frustrate the end of peace in
Athenian society, his act [of disobedience] may be justified.‖ See Larry May, Hobbes on Fidelity to
Law, 5 HOBBES STUD. 77, 87 (1992). Alice Ristroph uses Crito as a foil for what she advances as a
Hobbesian view of punishment. Contrary to Socrates’s conciliatory stance in the dialogue, Ristroph
wishes to argue that ―[h]ad Socrates agreed to escape with Crito, Hobbesian respect would have
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has entered into an agreement with the State to abide by its laws, in exchange for
which he has enjoyed all the benefits of Athenian citizenship, such as begetting,
rearing, and receiving education for his children in Athens.6 Admittedly, his
consent to this agreement has been more implicit than explicit, despite his
protestations to the contrary.7 But it is manifested in the fact that in his seventy
years in Athens he has had ample opportunity to express his dissatisfaction with
the State by quitting Athens for a different state. By choosing to stay, he has
manifested his acceptance of the burdens of Athenian citizenship along with its
benefits.8 This argument he places in the mouth of a personified version of the
Laws of Athens, who address him in the following terms:
[A]ny Athenian, on attaining to manhood and seeing for himself the
political organization of the state and us its laws, is permitted, if he is not
satisfied with us, to take his property and go away wherever he likes. . . .
On the other hand, if any one of you stands his ground when he can see
how we administer justice and the rest of our public organization, we
hold that by so doing he has in fact undertaken to do anything that we tell
him.9
From this it follows, say the Laws, ―[t]hat if you cannot persuade your
country you must do whatever it orders, and patiently submit to any punishment
that it imposes, whether it be flogging or imprisonment.‖10 The obligation to abide
by a juridical verdict, Socrates explains, is like the duty to do military service for
one’s country: ―Both in war and in the law courts and everywhere else you must do
whatever your city and your country command, or else persuade them in
accordance with universal justice . . . .‖11
Why did Socrates’s conception of punishment as civic duty disappear from
public discourse? And why, in particular, did it fail to make an appearance in the
punishment theory of later years? One reason is surely that the conception of civic
duty it advances stands in some tension with the rather more individualistic
foundations of the contemporary ideal of citizenship. Few modern writers would
defend the extreme fidelity to the State’s dictates Socrates seems to be advancing.
Socrates could have taken a more moderate position: that citizens who accept the
recognized this action as a blameless exercise in self-preservation.‖ Alice Ristroph, Respect and
Resistance in Punishment Theory, 97 CALIF. L. REV. 601, 628 (2009).
6
PLATO, supra note 1, at 35–36.
7
Id. at 37 (noting that ―there are very few people in Athens who have entered into this
agreement . . . as explicitly as I have‖).
8
Id. at 37–38.
9
Id. at 36–37.
10
Id. at 36.
11
Id.
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benefits of membership in the State commit themselves to abide by those verdicts
that are just and fair, and that they are released from debt of allegiance when the
State violates its own basic norms. It is curious, however, that even this more
limited version of the Socratic thesis did not make any systematic impression on
the punishment theory of later years.12
Instead, the modern debate coalesced virtually entirely around two positions:
The retributivist theory that a person should be punished only when and to the
extent that he deserves to suffer for the harm he has inflicted, and the utilitarian
claim that punishment is desirable from a social perspective only insofar as its
infliction would help deter the commission of future offenses, namely the
deterrence theory.13 The former position takes perpetrators one at a time, in that it
focuses on the moral standing of the individual perpetrator in light of his act. The
latter, by contrast, eclipses the individual in favor of the collective and determines
the legitimacy of the decision to punish in terms of its social welfare effects. As is
well known, contemporary punishment theory has become a protracted debate
between the perspective of individual justice assumed by retributivists and the
perspective of social justice assumed by utilitarians. In the process the
contractarian perspective on which Socrates premised his argument for the civic
virtue of punishment was eclipsed.
The absence of any well-developed contractarian theory of punishment seems
all the more puzzling in light of two salient facts: First, there is a robust
contractarian tradition that emerged in seventeenth century political philosophy,
first with the writings of Thomas Hobbes,14 later in the Enlightenment version of
this same tradition in the writings of Locke15 and Rousseau,16 and finally in a
Kantian version of the tradition, as developed by John Rawls.17 The absence of a
systematic contractarian alternative to retributive and utilitarian theories of
punishment is especially surprising in view of the breadth and depth of the
contractarian school of thought in political theory. There are of course hints here
12

Again, May and Ristroph have taken note of the theory, but they appear to reject its central
claim concerning the basis for obedience to the Laws. See supra note 5. One possible exception lies
in the writings on punishment by Jeffrie Murphy. See, e.g., JEFFRIE G. MURPHY, RETRIBUTION,
JUSTICE, AND THERAPY: ESSAYS IN THE PHILOSOPHY OF LAW 100 (1979) (―The criminal himself has no
complaint, because he has rationally consented to or willed his own punishment.‖).
13
For a general discussion of the distinction between deterrence justifications and retributive
justifications, see Claire Finkelstein, A Contractarian Approach to Punishment, in THE BLACKWELL
GUIDE TO THE PHILOSOPHY OF LAW AND LEGAL THEORY 207, 208–14 (Martin P. Golding & William
A. Edmundson eds., 2005).
14
See THOMAS HOBBES, LEVIATHAN (C.B. Macpherson ed., Penguin Books 1968) (1651).
15
See JOHN LOCKE, TWO TREATISES OF GOVERNMENT (Peter Laslett ed., Cambridge Univ.
Press 1988) (1690).
16
See JEAN-JACQUES ROUSSEAU, THE SOCIAL CONTRACT AND THE FIRST AND SECOND
DISCOURSES (Susan Dunn ed., Yale Univ. Press 2002) (1762).
17
See JOHN RAWLS, A THEORY OF JUSTICE (rev. ed. 1999).
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and there as to what such an account might look like—Hobbes’s own discussion of
punishment is all too brief, and not particularly satisfactory, but still there is a
foundation laid. Some in recent years have attempted to articulate a Rawlsian
version of a contractarian theory of punishment, but such theories are more
deontological than contractarian.18 The possibility of a truly contractarian
approach to punishment is as yet substantially unexplored. It is the hope of this
Essay to begin to sketch the outlines of such an account.19
Second, the policy questions at the heart of criminal justice debates are all
about the proper scope of deontological values, and how these values relate to the
sorts of utilitarian considerations the deterrence theorist advocates. Recent
discussions about the permissibility of torture illustrate the proposition particularly
vividly: The debate pits the overwhelming utilitarian pressures of military
necessity against the deontological intuition that human beings have rights and that
these rights are not entirely extinguished by membership in a group pledged to
destroy others. Procedural rights, such as the presumption of innocence as well as
doctrines like proportionality, support the suggestion that rights function as
deontological side constraints on the treatment of even the worst criminals, a fact
that deterrence theories cannot accommodate.
In the Bush Administration, utilitarian thinking on this question
predominated.20 President Obama had, by contrast, pledged his fidelity to the
deontological position that, as he said in his address to Congress, ―the United
States of America does not torture,‖21 though the subsequent behavior of his
administration have made such claims hard to credit.22 The standoff we have seen
in world opinion on this question bears witness to the conclusion of moral and
legal philosophers that human rights cannot be respected if they are balanced off
against considerations of utility, even if such considerations are marshaled for the
sake of guarding against human rights violations of another sort. The same can be
said of punishment as prevention: The idea that retributive values can somehow be
combined with, and balanced off against, utilitarian considerations pertaining to
punishment reform is a fantasy. All attempts at balancing collapse into a kind of
inconsistent exchange between the rights of those suspected of crimes, on the one
18

See, e.g., Sharon Dolovich, Legitimate Punishment in Liberal Democracy, 7 BUFF. CRIM. L.
REV. 307 (2004) (using Rawlsian ideas to generate an account of punishment).
19
I make a start in Claire Finkelstein, A Contractarian Argument Against the Death Penalty,
81 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1283 (2006).
20
See Claire Finkelstein, Vindicating the Rule of Law: Prosecuting Free Riders on Human
Rights, in WHEN GOVERNMENTS BREAK THE LAW: THE RULE OF LAW AND THE PROSECUTION OF THE
BUSH ADMINISTRATION 37 (Austin Sarat & Nasser Hussain eds., 2010).
21
President Barack Obama, Address to Joint Session of Congress (Feb. 24, 2009),
http://www.whitehouse.gov/the_press_office/Remarks-of-President-Barack-Obama-Address-to-JointSession-of-Congress; see also Finkelstein, supra note 20.
22
See Claire Finkelstein, Targeted Killing as a Pre-emptive Practice, in TARGETED KILLING:
LAW AND MORALITY IN AN ASYMMETRICAL WORLD (forthcoming 2012).
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hand, and the societal urgencies that seem to require the curtailment of such rights,
on the other. It is the job of legal philosophers to help import clarity about the
structure of our moral values and their degree of inviolability, with the hope that it
will help policy makers face up to their underlying normative commitments
squarely.
My point of departure will be an assumption that has become standard in the
punishment theory literature. Because it involves the deprivation of personal
liberty and the infliction of physical hardship, punishment is presumptively
impermissible.23 The practice of punishment therefore stands in need of
justification if the background moral objections to it are to be overridden.
Compare this to contract law, where the justification threshold for enforcing
contracts is much lower, given that each party to a contract has voluntarily
undertaken to allow the other party to sue to enforce the contract should he fail to
make good on his commitments. Indeed, barring objectionable third-party effects,
or paternalistic concerns, there is a presumption in favor of the enforceability of
consensual arrangements, and hence a need to justify the refusal to enforce a
contract. Penalties for civil wrongs lie somewhere in between these two extremes:
They involve a lower justificatory threshold than criminal penalties, given the
comparatively less invasive nature of the penalty, but they are not as easy to justify
as contractual arrangements.
The high justificatory hurdle for our practices of punishment provides a
reason to return to the forgotten contractarian approach to punishment: If it is
easier to justify the enforcement of voluntary arrangements than involuntary ones,
a theory of punishment that convincingly predicates a consensual foundation for
the institution should depict the institution as easier to justify than other types of
theories. If in addition, as I have argued elsewhere,24 the retributive and utilitarian
approaches to punishment have failed to meet their justificatory burdens, we have
yet further reason to turn to an account predicated on the idea of punishment as
consensual. In what follows, I will first briefly summarize the reasons for my
claim that retributivism and utilitarianism have thus far failed to provide

23

See, e.g., R.A. DUFF, TRIALS AND PUNISHMENTS 1 (1986) (―It is agreed that a system of
criminal punishment stands in need of some strenuous and persuasive justification . . . .‖); H.L.A.
HART, Prolegomenon to the Principles of Punishment, in PUNISHMENT AND RESPONSIBILITY: ESSAYS
IN THE PHILOSOPHY OF LAW 1 (2d ed. 2008). By contrast, Mitchell Berman has recently argued that
the standard assumption that punishment stands in need of justification is denied on at least one
theory of punishment. Properly understood, retributivism should be advanced as the claim that
punishment of a guilty offender is a moral good, rather than an objectionable violation of his rights,
and that as such it stands in need of no justification. Mitchell N. Berman, Punishment and
Justification, 118 ETHICS 258 (2008). Kantians seem to reject the assumption that punishment is
presumptively impermissible because they understand punishment as requiring authorization rather
than justification. See ARTHUR RIPSTEIN, FORCE AND FREEDOM: KANT’S LEGAL AND POLITICAL
PHILOSOPHY 300–24 (2009).
24
See Finkelstein, supra note 19.
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justifications for current criminal justice practices, and I will then attempt to sketch
a contractarian alternative that, as I see it, is exempt from these deficiencies.
II. PROBLEMS WITH THE TWO DOMINANT THEORIES
There have been many critiques of both retributivism and deterrence theory
over the years,25 and many responses to each of these critiques. For present
purposes, however, we can abbreviate what would otherwise be a lengthy
discussion by focusing on what I would suggest constitutes the central drawback of
each—the one that is most indicative of its deficiencies. Start with retributivism: It
is by now a familiar point among punishment theorists that the notion of ―desert‖
around which retributivism revolves is a highly ill-defined notion, one that does
not readily lend itself to translation into a precise metric for punishment. The
biblical suggestion for how to understand what the notion of ―desert‖ requires is of
course the concept of lex talionis or ―eye for eye, tooth for tooth.‖26 But it is hard
to see what lex talionis entails in the face of sadistic, pleasure-seeking defendants
like Patrick Kennedy, who brutally raped and injured his eight-year-old
stepdaughter, leaving her near death from loss of blood.27 Does giving a defendant
like Kennedy the equivalent of the suffering he inflicted on his victim mean
turning him over to the ravages of a comparable pleasure-seeking maniac who
happens to have a penchant for middle-aged men? Retributivists uniformly reject
this possibility,28 but they have little to put in its place.
Furthermore, let us suppose a suitable moral equivalent for Kennedy’s crime
can be found that is both an appropriate form of punishment and, we are confident,
represents the subjective equivalent of the suffering his victim must have
experienced. Can the retributivist metric be defended in this form? Consider an
argument against retributivism raised by Louis Kaplow and Steven Shavell.29 Let
us suppose, they say, that we always punish each offender exactly as much, and no
more than, he deserves.30 Assuming that not every offender will be caught and

25

See, e.g., PAUL H. ROBINSON, DISTRIBUTIVE PRINCIPLES OF CRIMINAL LAW: WHO SHOULD
BE PUNISHED HOW MUCH? (2008) (pointing out the deficiencies of theories on both sides of this
debate).
26
Deuteronomy 19:21; Exodus 21:24; Leviticus 24:20.
27
See Kennedy v. Louisiana, 554 U.S. 407, 412-15 (2008).
28
See, e.g., Jeremy Waldron, Lex Talionis, 34 ARIZ. L. REV. 25, 25 (1992):
[Lex talionis] cannot be thought to require that the very same action that constituted the
offense should be visited as punishment upon the offender. Rather, the requirement must
be that the act of punishment be similar to the offense in certain respects. Which respects
these should be is a matter of normative argument.
29
LOUIS KAPLOW & STEVEN SHAVELL, FAIRNESS VERSUS WELFARE (2002).
30
Id. at 301–03.
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punished,31 as is surely the case, the amount of punishment meted out in society as
a whole would then be insufficient to achieve effective deterrence. Why?
Assume, as a rough approximation, that the rational criminal would be deterred by
receiving somewhat more, by way of punishment, than the suffering he inflicted on
his victim. If he can discount the gravity of the threatened punishment by the
thirty, forty or fifty percent chance he will not actually be caught, he will have
inadequate incentive to refrain from committing such offenses and will not be
deterred.32
At first blush, Kaplow and Shavell’s point is compelling. If we assume an
offender’s deserved punishment to be a rough match for the level of punishment
that would deter him, then it is true that less than perfect detection would bring the
effective punishment to less than the deterrent level. But why on earth should we
assume this? Why assume that the utility a rational criminal receives from
committing a crime is equal in value to the disutility he inflicted on this victim?
Nevertheless, it is this assumption on which Kaplow and Shavell rely to connect
―desert‖ with deterrence, as desert is tied to the victim’s disutility, in their model,
and deterrence is a function of the criminal’s.33 Since the connection between the
criminal’s utility and the victim’s disutility is unwarranted, however, their point
about the relation between desert and deterrence is as well.
One reason for focusing on Kaplow and Shavell’s arguments in favor of
deterrence theory, despite the obvious difficulties with the account, is that it helps
to underscore the degree to which considerations of desert have nothing to do with
deterrence. Thus if one adopts a desert-based approach to punishment, there is no
guarantee that we will set punishment at levels designed for optimal deterrence.
And this implies that retributivists who insist on the desert criterion for punishment
will be forced to accept the inappropriateness of the goal of deterrence. Indeed, as
we saw earlier with the example of torture, their wholesale rejection of deterrence
as a social goal must be so thorough that they cannot even count the goal of
reducing the number of wrongful acts in society as one legitimate goal among
others. As Kaplow and Shavell put the point: ―[B]ecause retributivists ignore
deterrence and thus changes in the number of wrongful acts that are committed,
they by the same token ignore changes in the number of occasions on which
wrongdoers unfairly go free.‖34 The point, they insist, is that ―retributive notions
of fairness are associated with indifference to the number of instances of unfair
treatment.‖35 And they suggest that this ―is in tension with the demand of
retributive justice that fair punishment be imposed on everyone who commits a
31
32
33
34
35

Id. at 309.
Id. at 311–13.
Id. at 292–93.
Id. at 313.
Id.
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wrongful act.‖36 Retributivism thus appears internally inconsistent: If retributivists
truly care about rights violations, they should want to minimize the occasions on
which rights are violated across society, and that means seeking to deter such
violations through an effective scheme of incentives that operates by making an
example of current offenders. But since retributivists cannot consistently posit
deterrence of anything as a goal of the theory, pure retributivism is a failure.
Retributivists would reject the suggestion of internal inconsistency for they
would say that corrective justice is not aggregative—it is governed by case-by-case
considerations. So the fact that retributivists do not regard it as justified to seek to
minimize the number of rights violations by deterring future violations does not
stand in tension with their rejection of the legitimacy of violations of rights. This
is the sense in which retributivism is ineliminably deontological: Even if punishing
an offender more than he deserves would help to reduce the chances that victims
would have their rights violated in the future in ways that they do not deserve, such
a basis for punishment remains impermissible. But unfortunately, this response,
which shows that the retributivist has the courage of his convictions, does not
serve to vindicate the theory. For if retributive theory cannot, by its own
admission, accommodate the social goal of minimizing the number of rightsviolations in society, the theory is fundamentally ill-equipped to provide guidance
on important matters of criminal justice policy.
Because they do not seem aware of any options other than deterrence or
retribution, it is not surprising that Kaplow and Shavell regard this negative
argument as largely clinching the case for deterrence-based accounts in some form.
Presumably for this reason they do not feel the need to address the significant
weaknesses of deterrence-based accounts. But such weaknesses are not far to seek.
Let us turn, then, to deterrence theories to give them their just deserts.
Begin with a small, though fundamental, problem the deterrence theorist
faces. Let us return to the erroneous point made by Kaplow and Shavell, namely
that the pain inflicted on the victim is equivalent to the pleasure or benefit the
criminal receives from committing his crime. This error in thinking, which turned
out not to be problematic for the retributivist after all, will pose problems for the
deterrence theorist. Since deterrence operates on the incentives of the perpetrator,
rather than on the harm inflicted on the victim, deterrence theory is ineliminably
tied to a factor that has little to do with the social harm criminal activity imposes.
Matters are of course significantly different in the standard economic account of
tort law, where the undesirability of the conduct we are seeking to deter is entirely
a function of the harm it inflicts. In this context, it is plausible to set liability levels
by forcing potential tortfeasors to internalize the costs of their activities, thereby
creating incentives to induce tortfeasors to desist from, or take precautions against,
incidental harm that results from productive activities in which they are engaged.37
36
37

Id.
See id. at 85–154.
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We would therefore have no reason, in at least the standard case in tort law, to
establish a scheme of deterrence that was not tailored to the harmfulness of the
underlying activity. But in criminal law, the wrongness of the activity is defined
separately from the harm it produces, or the pain it inflicts on its victim, and hence
the aim of deterrence cannot be measured by the harmfulness of the conduct.38
In criminal law, we have a list of conduct that is judged to be per se
undesirable, and for which the optimal activity level is effectively zero.39 And this
means that since we know we want to eliminate as much of this conduct as
possible, within the bounds of our allowable resources for crime prevention, our
interest in deterrence narrows our focus exclusively to the incentives to the
criminal, forgetting all other concerns, such as the level of harm associated with
the activity. But since crimes that bring great benefit to the perpetrator will require
heavier penalties to deter effectively than crimes that bring little benefit or pleasure
to the perpetrator, it follows that crimes that cause relatively little harm to the
victim may actually require higher penalties than crimes that cause great pain and
suffering. We would have to punish theft more severely than homicide, for
example, if it turned out that the gains to criminals from theft were significantly
higher than the gains from homicide. The moral severity of the offense simply
does not play a role in determining the appropriate level of punishment in a
deterrence account. The deterrence theory of punishment is thus potentially out of
sync with rather deeply-felt intuitions about the gravity of harm and hence about
appropriate social treatment of offenses.
Second, deterrence theorists to date have no adequate response to the kind of
argument that is typically leveled against them by retributivists, namely the
standard objections of deontologists to utilitarian theories.40 Retributivists object
to the fact that deterrence theorists seek to justify the punishment of one person in
terms of the effect such punishment would have on a wholly different, uninvolved
other person at some point in the future. This objection has taken many guises
over the years. Retributivists say that deterrence theorists are committed to the
proposition that it would be permissible to punish one person to deter a larger
number of other people from committing crimes, even if the one was not himself
guilty of committing any crime. They thus cannot justify restricting punishment to
38
See Heidi M. Hurd & Michael S. Moore, Negligence in the Air, 3 THEORETICAL INQUIRIES
L. 333 (2002).
39
There is of course debate about this in economic writings on criminal law. Gary Becker’s
famous insight was that because achieving zero activity levels would require a level of resource
allocation to law enforcement that would be sub-optimal, we can say that there is a ―desirable,‖ nonzero activity level for every crime. This model effectively brings the theory of criminal deterrence
closer to the standard economic account of tort law. But the reason for favoring non-zero activity
levels is of course significantly different in the two accounts, and Becker is not asserting that a nonzero level of criminal activity is desirable in and of itself, in the absence of resource considerations.
See Gary S. Becker, Crime and Punishment: An Economic Approach, 76 J. POL. ECON. 169 (1968).
40
See Finkelstein, supra note 19.
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the guilty. Alternatively retributivists point out that deterrence theorists are unable
to account for any requirement of proportionality even as against guilty offenders,
as disproportionate punishment may be required for optimal deterrence. (This in
effect was the point I made against Kaplow and Shavell earlier.) Finally,
retributivists sometimes argue that even if deterrence theory could limit
punishment to the guilty, and even if it could somehow insist on penalties that
were proportionate to that guilt, deterrence is still morally unacceptable because it
amounts to using offenders for the sake of the achievement of social welfare goals,
and this fails to respect their humanity. This basic objection I have put elsewhere
in terms of the judgments of responsibility that are implicit in the deterrence
theorists’ approach to punishment: Deterrence, as standardly argued for, is a
justification for punishment that travels across persons, since it purports to hold
one agent responsible in order to deter future acts of responsibility of other agents,
and as such conflicts with fundamental intuitions of fairness to which our criminal
justice system is committed.41
Furthermore, and most relevant from the standpoint of the contractarian
approach we will consider shortly, deterrence arguments do not take a form that
the offender himself would likely regard as providing a justification for his
punishment. After all, he might argue, he surely has a right to be punished in light
of considerations that pertain to his act alone, whatever form such considerations
ultimately take. The various attempts deterrence theorists have made to
accommodate the deontological concerns—such as that deterrence will not work if
it is not fundamentally tailored towards guilty offenders or is significantly out of
keeping with retributive intuitions, and so forth—seem largely to miss the mark, as
they fail to answer the demand for individualized justification that an offender may
rightly have. Yet once again, the need to justify the treatment of an offender to
that offender in terms that are particular to that person’s situation—and the fact
that retributivism can meet that demand far better than deterrence theories—does
not clinch the case for retributivism any more than the inability to accommodate
the most basic needs of crime control policy clinches the case for deterrence
theory.
It is hard to avoid the conclusion that neither retributivism nor deterrence
theory is ultimately equipped to justify the practice of punishment in something
resembling its current form. Each requires the suppression of strongly-felt
intuitions that only the other seems able to accommodate, and yet the history of
efforts to marry retributive and utilitarian considerations in a mixed theory of
punishment have been equally unsuccessful, as they must give primacy to one
rationale for punishment or the other, and as such remain subject to the
fundamental objections to each.42 Once we understand that a justification for
41

See id. at 1299.
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punishment must be able to combine the need for social control, on the one hand,
with providing an offender with a justification for his treatment that he himself can
recognize as legitimate and that neither standard rationale for punishment can
accomplish this, the search for an entirely different sort of account of punishment
becomes compelling.
III. TOWARDS A CONTRACTARIAN APPROACH TO PUNISHMENT
To summarize the argument thus far: I have argued, against retributivists, that
a theory of punishment that gives no weight to considerations of deterrence is
unable to serve as a guide for actual questions of criminal justice reform. And I
have argued, against utilitarians, that a theory that is unable to provide an
individualized justification to the criminal for his punishment and instead seeks to
justify his treatment by its effects on another agent is morally unacceptable. The
contractarian approach to punishment holds out the hope of a conjoined solution to
these problems: It combines the social aim of deterrence with an individualized
approach to the justification for imposing punishment on a particular agent, thus
providing the criminal with an argument for his own punishment that he can
accept, at the same time that it establishes a realistic basis for institutional
planning. We will now consider in detail how a contractarian theory might
accomplish these aims.
The prospect for a more adequate theory of punishment lies largely in the
contractarian’s insistence that punishment be voluntarily imposed. Assume that a
given punishment scheme has at least moderately strong deterrent efficacy. A
rational contractor would agree to live in a regime that furnishes this level of
deterrence to serious crimes, and hence would prefer it to one in which such
deterrence is absent. As the justificatory burden for consensual arrangements is
particularly low, it should be easier to justify the infliction of punishment on such
an account than on any other.43
I am not arguing that a consensual approach to punishment can justify the
infliction of punishment merely by reference to the idea, if true, that citizens have
consented to the scheme of punishment under which they must live. Consent
Justifying Aim‖ of punishment, id. at 8, the legitimate pursuit of deterrence must be limited by more
general moral constraints, such as constraints on punishing the innocent as well as principles of
proportionality. See id. at 1–27. The problem is that it is unclear what the relationship is between the
general justifying aim of punishment and the foregoing retributive side-constraints, a problem that
afflicts mixed theories generally. In more recent writings, Paul Robinson advances a mixed theory of
punishment, according to which punishment should be distributed according to the empirical beliefs
the general public has about desert. But the ultimate justification for a principle that distributes
punishment according to public opinion about desert is that distributing punishment in this way has
important crime control consequences. The theory thus appears to be more of a straight forward
deterrence account than a truly mixed theory. See, e.g., ROBINSON, supra note 25, at 135–74.
43
See C.S. Nino, A Consensual Theory of Punishment, 12 PHIL. & PUB. AFF. 289 (1983).
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considered by itself does not have such normative force, as is reflected in the fact
that the criminal law rejects consent as a defense to most crimes, most notably to
murder. Although consent is a defense to some crimes, such as rape and battery, it
is limited in its operation even in these cases to situations in which the victim does
not suffer harm. A consensual theory of punishment, then, must be prepared to
explain the relevance of consent to its account of the justifiability of punishment.
As Socrates suggested in his argument to Crito, it is not consent alone that justifies
punishment, but consent premised on the benefit the citizen who consents to abide
by the State’s dictates takes himself to be receiving in the bargain.44 Thus while
neither benefit from a scheme of punishment nor consent to its terms would be
sufficient by itself to justify the imposition of punishment on a particular offender,
the combination of benefit and consent may be a different matter.
It might be thought that a contractarian approach only mirrors the basic
utilitarian account inside the structure of a social agreement. But this impression
would be incorrect. A utilitarian social agreement, such as Harsanyi might have
recommended, would discount the costs and benefits of a deterrence scheme. 45
Contractors in this sort of world would merely ask whether they could expect to
fare better under a system of deterrence than without it, taking into account the
expected benefits of such a system and discounting them by the expected costs.
Agreement in the contractarian tradition, by contrast, produces different results, for
it is subject to several critical assumptions:
1. Rational contractarians assume that human beings are rational in the
sense that they are primarily interested in maximizing their welfare and
their preferences are generally not other-regarding.
2. They assume that each has knowledge of each other’s rationality and,
further, that each has knowledge of each other’s knowledge of his
rationality. This is the so-called ―common knowledge‖ assumption.46
3. They assume that although rational, human beings are highly risk-averse
when it comes to fundamental aspects of their welfare. With regard to
institutions that apply to what Rawls would call the ―basic structure of
society,‖47 they would seek to assure themselves of faring better in their
post-agreement condition than they did according to their pre-agreement
baseline. I shall refer to this as the ―benefit requirement.‖48

44

See PLATO, supra note 1, at 36–37.
See John C. Harsanyi, Morality and the Theory of Rational Behaviour, in UTILITARIANISM
AND BEYOND 39 (Armartya Sen & Bernard Williams eds., 1982).
46
See, e.g., Edward McClennen, The Theory of Rationality for Ideal Games, 65 PHIL. STUD.
193, 193 (1992).
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RAWLS, supra note 17, at 6–7.
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See my early discussion of this condition in Finkelstein, supra note 19, at 1316–24.
45

332

OHIO STATE JOURNAL OF CRIMINAL LAW

4.

[Vol 8:319

While the contractors do not operate behind a thick veil of ignorance, as
in Rawls’s theory,49 they remain agnostic about their future choices.
That is, in interpreting the benefit requirement, they seek assurances that
they will benefit under any future life circumstance or choice they might
make. They seek, in other words, an assurance of benefit for the worst
case scenario under any rule proposed for an agreement that pertains to
the basic structure.
5. They assume that any agreement pertaining to the basic structure must be
unanimous and universal, meaning that consent must be unanimous and
that benefit must be universal in order for our institution of punishment
to be both voluntary and welfare enhancing.
One effect of these conditions is that the social goal of deterrence performs a
function it could not in a utilitarian account: It is able to dictate specific parameters
for the punishment of each separate crime. In this way, the notion of deterrence
can be made to generate normative constraints on punishment. The inability to do
this was the central weakness of deterrence theory we considered previously.
Now let us consider how the contractarian approach would fare in application
to a specific decision regarding punishment. Consider a group of contractors
trying to decide how much and what kind of protection they should institute for
private property. They have already selected a series of rules establishing a system
of ownership, and they now seek a means of enforcement. They must weigh the
following considerations. On the one hand, they would like the maximum
deterrence feasible for violations of ownership rights. On the other hand, they also
want to protect their personal freedom and would like to maximize independence
of choice without interference from others. Maximizing independence of choice
would leave no protection for ownership, while maximizing protection for private
property would sharply curtail personal liberty.
In balancing security and liberty, each person asks himself: Would I be better
off in a society that established penalties for theft and other violations of property
norms than I am at my current baseline welfare? In answering this question, and
applying our assumptions, each agent would weigh the benefit he would receive
from increased deterrence against the loss he would suffer in the worst case
scenario—that is, the balance of gains and losses he would experience in the worst
case scenario under the rule. The worst case scenario is clearly the case in which
the agent has little property to protect and is most disadvantaged by the rule, and
this would be the case in which he is the object of the increased penalty himself.
Thus he must ask whether he would be advantaged on balance from penalties for
theft in a world in which he was himself subject to such penalties, as compared, for
example, with a baseline in which there was no protection for private ownership at
all. If the penalties for theft are set too low, the deterrent effect will be
insignificant and private property will not be protected. If the penalties are too
49
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high, agents receiving the penalty would be worse off than they would be in the
absence of private property and the benefit requirement would not be satisfied.
To be more specific, imagine how parties to an original social contract would
reason about a proposed penalty—for example, a twenty-year sentence for grand
larceny. For the sake of argument, let us suppose this reasoning takes place not in
a state of nature but against the backdrop of an existing, but constantly evolving,
regime. And let us imagine each person can place a precise value on the totality of
his personal possessions. Suppose further that under the current regime, which
allows a maximum sentence for such thefts of ten years, each person can fairly
well estimate the likelihood of theft over a certain fixed period of time. Now
imagine that the proposed change in the maximum for such sentences doubles—it
moves from ten to twenty years. In this case, we would expect the overall
probability of theft would be cut in half.
Standard economic or utilitarian approaches to deterrence calculations would
now regard the case for increasing the penalty for theft from ten to twenty years as
nearly made, with several possible caveats: First, increasing the penalty for theft
could have an undesirable effect on the incentives potential offenders have to
commit other crimes. For example, if the penalty for bicycle theft is significantly
increased, that would reduce the differential between the penalty for bicycle theft
and the penalty for auto theft, with the result that some offenders inclined to steal
bicycles might now steal automobiles. Similarly, as Justice Kennedy has recently
written in Kennedy v. Louisiana, increasing the penalty for rape to death would
decrease the disincentives to murder the victims of rape.50 Second, deterrence
theorists are forced to evaluate the benefits of the enhanced deterrent effect in light
of the total economy of costs and benefits such a change would entail. If the cost
to the State of imposing the increased penalty is also increased, then the marginal
social benefit of the additional penalty might not ultimately be positive. The
utilitarian case for adopting such a penalty, then, would be subject to the
requirement that the benefits of increased deterrence are worth the costs.
One point that this discussion underlines is that deterrence in a utilitarian
theory does not provide a justification that is addressed to individual offenders, as
there need be nothing in it for them, even in the ex-ante sense. For this version of
deterrence theory requires neither that each individual member of society regard
himself as benefited nor that individual members of society consent to the
deterrence scheme under which they are protected. While the traditional appeal to
deterrence does restrict enhancements in punishment to instances where social
welfare will increase in the aggregate, that social benefit may turn out to be
unevenly distributed and hence may improve the lot of the few at the cost of the
many. The benefit requirement suggests that rational contractors would reject any
such gamble.
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Accordingly, on a contractarian approach, a member of the putative
punishment agreement would consider whether he could expect to benefit under
the worst case scenario, namely the case in which he himself ends up subject to the
penalty. Now, in addition to considering the benefits of the additional deterrence
under the increased sentence for theft, a social contractor must weigh the value to
him of that increased protection for property against the disvalue he would
experience from an additional ten years in prison. Because the odds of loss of
property are relatively low, against the background of a ten-year sentence, the
marginal increase in deterrent efficacy in our example is unlikely to outweigh the
significant loss in value the rational agent would attach to an additional ten-year
loss of liberty. Hence, the benefit test would most likely not be satisfied.
We might compare the marginal increase in penalty just considered to a
different kind of decision, namely the decision whether to punish theft at all. If our
contractors start from a baseline of zero punishment for theft and consider the
adoption of a ten-year sentence for that crime, they would likely reach a different
conclusion. For the cost of failing to adopt the contemplated penalty is now very
high: assuming there were no other penalties to protect the interest individuals
have in their property, the absence of the ten-year penalty would mean that all
property was insecure. Contractors who have already settled on a scheme of
distribution in their basic social contract would now have no way of enforcing that
agreement. They would in effect be living in a property-less regime. Against this
background, the increased deterrent benefit in moving from a regime with a tenyear sentence for theft would prove a benefit to every member of society, even
those to whom this penalty is later applied. In response to the question, ―In light of
what is my punishment justified?‖ we can say to the offender: ―Your punishment is
justified because the benefits of a deterrent scheme that enabled you to protect
your property have been great enough to you, throughout your life, that they
overwhelm even the disvalue you are presently experiencing from your ten-year
sentence. Your life is still better than it would have been in the absence of that
sentencing provision, despite the fact that it has resulted in your incarceration.‖
The benefit, in short, is not just to society generally: It is one that attaches to each
particular offender and supplies each with a ground for consenting to the deterrent
scheme under which he is to be punished.
One will now be tempted to object as follows: The only reason the ten-year
sentence turned out to be justified, on the account I have proposed, is that we
started from a baseline of zero punishment. But surely if we start from a baseline
of zero punishment, the twenty-year sentence would appear justified as well. We
would accept any penalty as legitimate for a serious crime like theft rather than live
with conditions of zero deterrence. But once we start at a different, higher
baseline, no penalty will seem justified. So the account either makes punishment
too easy to justify or too hard: It is too easy if the alternative is no punishment, and
it is too hard if any alternative to a zero level of punishment is available.
But I do not think this critique is ultimately correct, though I concede the
critical importance of specifying for social contractors the baseline from which
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they bargain. Suppose we start with a baseline of zero punishment and instead of
considering only one option, our rational contractors consider two: they consider
adopting either a mandatory ten-year sentence or, alternatively, the death penalty.
Under these circumstances, rational contractors would unhesitatingly choose the
ten-year sentence. Why? With a ten-year sentence we can assume that the
chances that an individual contractor would lose his property to theft would be
relatively low. Deterrence at this level of punishment, in other words, is fairly
effective. Suppose, however, that if the contractors adopted the death penalty their
risk of losing their property would be reduced to zero. Still, the increase in
disutility to a rational contractor of the difference between a penalty of ten years
and being put to death is so extreme that the rather small deterrent benefit he
experienced would not seem worth the added cost to him. So even against the
background of zero punishment, not every penalty will turn out to be justified.
Would a penalty like death ever be justified by this method? It is unlikely that
rational contractors would accept the death penalty, even in the absence of any
alternative sanctions. Rational agents simply do not regard losing their lives for
the sake of protecting their property as a trade-off worth making. But arguably
matters would be different if individuals were asked to consider a roster of possible
penalties for murder. Since the value they place on their lives is much greater than
the value they place on their property, rational contractors might consider death a
sensible price to pay for lengthening their own earlier lives.51
Thus in a world in which no penalties were available other than death, the
death penalty might be selected by the contractors in an initial position of choice.
In that case, the alternative to having any punishment for murder would be the
worst sort of violent state of nature, one that, if Hobbes is to be believed, would be
so brutal and insecure that no one could expect to survive into old age.52 Relative
to the state of nature, even the person condemned to die would regard himself as
benefited, given the horror of his life in the absence of such penalties. If, however,
the contractors faced a choice of a mandatory life sentence or death for murder,
they would evaluate things differently. The question they would ask themselves in
this case would be: Does the marginal increase in personal security from the death
penalty, as compared with a mandatory life sentence, deter murder so much that it
outweighs the marginal loss of personal security a person subject to that penalty
would suffer? Here we can see that even in the unlikely event that each
application of the death penalty deterred eight additional murders, as compared
with life in prison without parole, the marginal value of that added deterrence
would likely be outweighed by the marginal cost of the death penalty to an
individual contractor. Weighing this likely effect in advance, the contractors
would reject the death penalty. This conclusion replicates the results of actual jury
sentences with the increasing availability of life without parole as an alternative to
51
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death. In the states in which life without parole is made routinely available, the
willingness of juries to assign the death penalty has been substantially
diminished.53
Notice the advantages of rational contractarianism as compared with the two
leading approaches to punishment. On the one hand, rational contractarianism
solves the central problem associated with pure deterrence theories—the problem
that punishment on this view involves traveling across persons. It is true that
according to rational contractarianism, deterrence is the basic aim of the
punishment agreement, and deterrence schemes usually involve traveling across
persons. But the problem does not arise on this view, for although the institution
of punishment would be deterrence-based, and hence would hold one person
responsible for the acts of another, each individual punished would have agreed to
these conditions with respect to his own future violations of the covenant. Each
member of the social contract pledges his fidelity and offers his willingness to
submit to punishment should he fail to make good on his promise. Since he offers
this guarantee in order to induce his fellows to contract with him, he in effect
furthers his defensive interests in doing so. There is thus no conflict with the
rights of self-defense he so carefully safeguards and no sacrifice of individual
welfare. The contractarian account is able to incorporate deterrence as a social
goal of paramount importance, but as this goal is given an individual interpretation,
the usual objections fail to apply.
On the other hand, the contractarian theory we have explored captures the
greatest strength of the retributive principle by establishing a kind of moral
equivalence between crime and punishment. The benefit requirement demands
that each contractor consider both what he gains from protecting the interest in
question and what he would suffer if punished. Since the importance of the
underlying institution establishes the gravity of the violation for which punishment
is contemplated, the benefit requirement creates a metric for matching offenses
with penalties. Moreover, it does so without making the retributive theory’s
mistake of rejecting deterrence as a legitimate aim of punishment. It is this feature
of retributive theories that presumably relegates them to a world of high theory,
since the notion of desert is ill-equipped to provide a foundation for rational
policy-making in the area of criminal justice.54
53
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IV. OBJECTIONS
There are several objections to the argument I offered in the preceding
section, and I shall consider these in the remainder of this Essay. First, a
significant objection to my argument is that a person has a choice over whether to
commit a crime and thus whether he risks suffering the death penalty or any other
penalty is under his control. If this is true, a rational agent would opt for the most
stringent penalties for all sorts of crimes as long as stringent penalties are costjustified in a social sense. For he can thus capture the up-side of stringent
deterrence and reject the down-side by simply avoiding the worst case scenario on
his own. In this way he would maximize his net anticipated security, since he
would benefit from the deterrent effects of the harsh penalties but could be sure
that he would never end up subject to them. This objection, then, rejects my fourth
assumption, namely that rational agents would reason from the worst case
scenario, including scenarios that are the product of choice.55
I would argue, however, that rational contractors may still want to guard
against excessive penalties in case they are not deterred.56 Rational individuals are
likely to allow for the possibility that they may feel the need to commit a crime in
the future, and so they may choose to limit the severity of societal responses to it.
We only need imagine that it might be to an agent’s benefit to commit a crime,
despite the fact that the agent also views it as beneficial ex ante to make that act a
crime. If so, the rational agent might wish to preserve his ability to commit that
crime and so would not agree to the harshest penalties in deciding ex ante how
much punishment it deserves. And he might wish to preserve this option, even
though he is aware that preserving the option for himself would preserve that same
option for everyone else.
One way to understand this seemingly odd suggestion is to notice that rational
agents would eschew social rules that severely restrict or limit their freedom of
choice to the extent it is feasible for them to do so. That is, their desire to deter
crime must always be balanced against a countervailing desire to protect the range
of choices available to them. If, for example, the death penalty purchases only a
marginal increase in deterrence at the cost of a substantial increase in the coercive
55
Furthermore, the agent might actually be pleased with the deterrent effect on himself, since
the higher the penalties for crime, the less likely he would be to commit a crime. Presumably he has
a current preference that he not commit crimes in the future. If, by contrast, the penalties for a given
crime are too low, he loses both the deterrent benefit with regard to others and increases the
likelihood that he himself will commit a crime that will make him subject to the penalty. And this
might suggest that rational contractors would not set any limits on the penalties they saw it as rational
to adopt. I am indebted to Dan Markel for this point.
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having committed a crime at all. I have assumed throughout that punishments could be administered
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the benefit requirement will have an obvious reason to reject harsh penalties.
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powers of the State, it would be rational to reject it. Because the particular identity
of the crimes to which the death penalty would be applied remains subject to
change, individuals cannot ensure that they are able to protect their freedom where
they would most wish for it. Limiting the severity of the punishments that can be
inflicted for the most severe crimes is thus a way to blunt the force of undesirable
liberty restrictions.
Here is yet another way to put the point: On a contractarian theory, it is
rational to establish a strong system of rights to bodily integrity, rights that cannot
be derogated from in specific cases for the sake of short-term gains. While future
members of society might regard themselves as benefiting from a contract in which
others agree to subject themselves to the harsh penalties on the condition that every
other member of society is willing to do the same, such an agreement would
conflict with the broader principles of protection for bodily integrity and
enforcement of defensive rights that rational members of society would be
concerned to establish. The same, by contrast, need not be said of agreements to
be subject to deprivations of liberty. Incarceration leaves the body intact and one’s
natural life extended. It allows for the continuation of plans and projects of at least
a rudimentary sort and does not foreclose challenging one’s conviction and perhaps regaining one’s liberty. It also allows for the possibility of compensation
with future benefits, whether through advancement of personal projects or the
bestowing of various pleasures.
A related objection has to do with the scope of the individuals that should be
included in the initial agreement. On traditional contractarian approaches, those
who violate the terms of the contract are thereafter totally excluded from it.57 On
such a view, the contract itself imposes no limitations on what it is acceptable to do
to violators. Locke, for example, argues that those who violate the terms of the
contract are like wild beasts; they can be hunted down and killed
indiscriminately.58 And, according to Rousseau, ―every evildoer who attacks
social rights becomes by his crimes a rebel and a traitor to his country; by violating
its laws he ceases to be a member of it.‖59 The present objection is just a version
of that idea, namely that the contract ought not to include those who are violators
or free riders, and so we are entitled to treat such individuals in any way we see fit.
From a certain perspective, the point is quite defensible. If society is ―a
cooperative venture for mutual advantage,‖60 it makes sense to think of criminals
as outside the scope of all voluntary arrangements, since cooperating with them
57
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would not be to the advantage of those who remain faithful to their terms.
Moreover, it arguably makes no sense to include the treatment of contract violators
within the terms of the contract itself, since that seems to suppose that we are
taking into account the perspective of those who intend not to abide by the terms of
our initial contract regarding the basic structure.
But despite these merits, I think the traditional approach to contract violators
should be rejected. For while it is true that the initial contract is made only among
those who accept the conditions of cooperation, cooperators can become defectors
at any point after all have agreed to the contract’s terms. It is therefore incorrect to
equate defection with non-cooperation at the outset.61 Several additional considerations support this approach. First, defections can be large or small, and it
may be that it is still advantageous to cooperate with those who defect, as long as
their defections are sufficiently minor. Second, it is not possible to address the
problem of non-cooperation at the outset in any way other than by refusing to
contract. But defectors are themselves subject to the terms of an antecedent
agreement and can therefore be dealt with contractually.
A final argument against the traditional approach to violators is that it simply
seems wrong to think of a defector as beyond the bounds of all social interaction,
someone who deserves none of the protections or entitlements that those who enter
into rational relations with others receive. We do not normally think of even the
most heinous violations as depriving their perpetrators of basic dignitary rights,
such as the right to be free from torture, the right to speak in one’s own defense,
and the right to appropriate levels of bodily dignity and comfort. It is true that
non-rational creatures are often thought of as possessing a subset of these same
rights, and we cannot think of them as parties to a social contract. This suggests a
basis for assigning rights to biological agents outside the contractual context. But
the protections afforded such creatures are thought to be significantly weaker than
those extended to even the worst criminals. For these and other reasons, the
conditions under which human beings may permissibly inflict sanctions for noncooperation on members of their own kind should be thought of as governed by an
antecedent agreement they make to enforce the terms of cooperative interaction.
Only by including potential violators in the social contract can the
contractarian model provide any practical guidance to a theory of punishment.
This allows us to capture within a contractarian framework the basic deontological
intuitions that made retributivism seem initially attractive. As we have seen, these
deontological intuitions are insufficient in and of themselves to produce a theory of
punishment directly. It is only when combined with the aim of deterrence that they
find their proper place. Normally, the aim of deterrence and intuitions concerning
desert cannot coexist in a theory of punishment. In the contractarian approach we
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have explored, however, these elements complement each other without
contradiction.
V. CONCLUSION
Let us return briefly to Socrates and recall in particular his suggestion that
fidelity to the commitment one has made to obey the laws constitutes a civic duty,
something akin to military service or jury duty.62 We now are in a position to put
some flesh on the bones of this suggestion. In a more developed version of the
contractarian suggestion, the duty to abide by the terms of one’s punishment is a
duty owed not to the State, but to one’s fellow contractors, to whom one has
pledged one’s commitment to the terms of the contract. As Hobbes makes clear,
those who would violate the contract are free-riders on the welfare of others, and
no rational agent, knowing them to be such, would have agreed to contract with
them in the first place.63 We now, however, have a basis for understanding why
Socrates’s version of the civic duty to undergo punishment is more extreme than
need be. If the duty to abide by the State’s dictates is a duty owed to one’s fellows,
that duty need not be absolute. For there are rare times when it works to the
advantage of all to disregard those dictates, as when the State has overstepped the
authorization that rational agents saw it as in their interest to give. Such rejection
of the State’s dictates might be full or partial: A full-scale rejection would be
warranted when the State no longer seeks to justify its authority to an entire
segment of the population that authorized its power over them. Such might have
been the case in Hitler’s Germany or Stalin’s Russia. The grounds for a partial
rejection we have seen in our own times: When the government consistently and
repeatedly demands action in the name of public benefit that benefits few and
injures many, once again it has flouted the conditions of its original grant of
authority, and its power over its subjects can, with right, be rejected.
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